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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Nos. 46830-2019

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

& 46831-2019

)

V.

)

Kootenai County Case Nos.

)

CR-2018—1508

& CR28-18-7990

)

JOHNNY F. PHILP,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

ISSUES
1.

Has Philp

failed to

2.

Has Philp

failed to

motions?

show

the district court abused

show

its

the district court abused

sentencing discretion?

its

discretion

by denying

his

Rule 35

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

state

jaw and With
state

charged Johnny F. Philp With felony domestic battery for breaking his girlfriend’s

battery

0n a police ofﬁcer. (46830

R., pp.59-60.)

While

that case

was pending,

the

opened a new case against Philp and charged him with seven counts of witness intimidation

for repeatedly trying to prevent his girlfriend

from

testifying against

(46831 R., pp.40-44.) At a joint entry of plea hearing, Philp entered

him

in the original case.

m1

pleas for one count

ofbattery on a law enforcement ofﬁcer, one count of witness intimidation, and an

0f Violating a n0 contact order. (46831 R., p.57.) In exchange, the

state

amended charge

agreed to dismiss

all

0f

the remaining charges in both cases. (46831 R., p.60.)

In the ﬁrst case, the district court sentenced Philp

on the charge of battery 0n a law

enforcement ofﬁcer t0 ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed. (46830 R., pp.1 17-18.) In the second case,
the district court sentenced Philp

ﬁxed.

(46831 R., pp.68-69.)

(46830 R., p.1

18;

46831

on the charge of witness intimidation to ﬁve years With two years

Those two sentences were imposed consecutive

R., p.69.)

The

district court

t0

one another.

sentenced Philp t0 time served 0n the charge

ofviolating a no contact order. (1/14/2019 TL, p.37, Ls.3-6.)
Philp ﬁled a Rule 35 motion in both cases in an effort to reduce his sentences. (46830 R.,

pp.120-21; 46831 R., pp.71-72.) The
R., p.96.) Philp timely appealed.

district court

denied both motions. (46830 R., p.145; 46831

(46830 R., pp.122-25; 46831 R., pp.73-76.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When

evaluating whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d

621, 628 (2016); State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). “Ifa sentence

1

North Carolina

V.

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

2

is

within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35

is

a plea for

leniency, and [this Court] review[s] the denial 0f the motion for an abuse 0f discretion.” State V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

ARGUMENT
I.

Philp

The

Has Failed T0 Show That The
district court

did not abuse

years With four years ﬁxed.

its

District

discretion

presumed

It is

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

when it imposed an aggregate

that the

ﬁxed portion of

sentence of ten

the sentence will be the

defendant’s probable term 0f conﬁnement. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391

Where

(2007).

a sentence

demonstrating that

it is

(citations omitted).

To

sentence

is

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 0f

a clear abuse of discretion.

facts.

The

Li.

differing weights

show

at 8,

the sentence

is

368 P.3d

at

628

excessive under

Li.

reasonable if

it

appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective 0f

protecting society and to achieve any or

retribution.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

carry this burden the appellant must

any reasonable View 0f the

A

is

all

0f the related goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation, or

has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them

district court

When deciding upon the

sentence. Li. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State V. Moore, 131

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the

need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference t0 the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

at

628 (quoting

ﬁxed within

m,

146 Idaho

the limits prescribed

at

by

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

its

8,

View of

368 P.3d

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute Will ordinarily not be considered an abuse 0f

by

discretion

Li

the trial court.”

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

Philp’s sentences fall Within the limits set

sentence for battery of a law enforcement ofﬁcer
court sentenced Philp t0

years,

ﬂ

is

ﬁve

years,

ﬂ

LC.

§

Furthermore, the

I.C. § 18-915(3),

and the

R., pp.1 17-18).

The maximum

.

.

district

18—2604(3); LC. § 18-112, and the

district court

weighed the necessary

factors in determining Philp’s

The district court expressly stated that it considered “how t0 best protect

sentences.

The maximum

sentenced Philp to ﬁve years with two years ﬁxed (46831 R., pp.68-69).

district court

deter

ﬁve

the applicable statutes.

ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed (46830

sentenced for Witness intimidation

to

is

by

.

future

criminal conduct,

circumstances[,] and then

how

t0 help

9)

‘6

the punishment that

any rehabilitation

that

society,”

“how

society expects under these

can be aided from a sentence that’s

given.” (1/14/2019 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-19.) After describing the facts of each crime, the district court

found “these particular crimes

t0

be serious offenses.” (1/14/2019

The

Tr., p.33, Ls.9-17.)

district

court also observed Philp’s lengthy criminal history, including burglaries and drug charges.

(1/14/2019 TL, p.34, Ls.19-25;

ﬂ

PSI, pp.8-13.)

And the

district court

explained

its

decision t0

run the sentences consecutively:

I’m doing the consecutive sentencing, even though not asked for by the prosecution,
because it seems t0 me that it is appropriate to run sentences consecutive when one
commits battery 0n a law enforcement ofﬁcer. A Violent crime with a Violent
criminal history, although long ago, and then attempts to inﬂuence, impede
witnesses t0 escape from the consequences 0fthat new Violent felony. It seems like
rather than those sentences running together, those ought to be consecutive to each
other.

(1/14/2019

Tr., p.37, Ls.7-17.)

Philp erroneously argues that the district court abused

its

discretion because

it

did not give

Philp lesser sentences in light 0f his substance abuse issues, his remorse and acceptance 0f

responsibility,

and his family support.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)

First, the district court

expressly considered Philp’s history 0f substance abuse in fashioning his sentence.

The

district

court recognized that Philp has a “substance abuse history,” including the use 0f alcohol,

methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine. (1/14/2019

Tr., p.34, Ls.6-18.)

The

district court also

recognized that Philp had a “period ofwhat appears t0 be some prolonged substance abuse criminal
conduct.”

(1/14/2019 Tr., p.35, Ls.1 1-16.)

Ultimately, the district court determined “that’s a

category 0f risk there with a person with this kind of criminal history that’s using drugs and hasn’t
really got into the workforce signiﬁcantly.”

district

(1/14/2019

Tr., p.35,

L.17 — p.36, L.1.) Thus, the

considered Philp’s substance abuse problem and determined, based 0n the speciﬁc facts 0f

Philp’s case, that the substance abuse problem did not merit lesser sentences than imposed. That

is

not an abuse 0f discretion.

Second, Philp’s belated and generic expressions ofremorse and responsibility ring hollow?

He

claimed not t0 remember anything until after he was in custody because he “blacked out” from

consuming meth

The

that his friend allegedly slipped into his beer Without his

district court rejected his explanation: “the

slipped

him some drug.” {1/14/2019

Court simply

Tr., p.36, Ls.2-7.)

knowledge. (PSI,

rej ects this

idea that

p.8.)

somebody

Philp also claimed that he “accidentally

kicked a deputy which then resulted in [Philp] getting beat up by 4 deputies.” (PSI, p.8 (emphasis
added).) That

is

neither an expression of remorse nor acceptance of responsibility. Moreover,

that Philp said related to the witness intimidation charge

individual

2

know

was

that

he “tried several times t0

let

Without breaking a no-contact order or intimidating a Witness.” (1/ 14/2019

all

the

Tr.,

showed remorse and acceptance of responsibility at the
sentencing hearing is curious given his counsel’s concession at the hearing 0n Philp’s Rule 35
motions that, “at Mr. Philp’s sentencing, there was a level ofnonacceptance 0n [his] client’s behalf
for his—there was a lot 0f excuse-making.” (5/17/2019 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-15.)
Indeed, Philp’s claim 0n appeal that he

5

p.15, L.20

like

—

p.16, L.7.)

While

it is

much more

not entirely clear what Philp meant, that sounds

an excuse than remorse or responsibility. In any event, the

district court

Philp’s statements 0f remorse and acceptance of responsibility and

deserved the imposed sentences. (1/14/2019

That

Tr., p.33, Ls.9- 1 7.)

not an abuse ofdiscretion.

The

Third, Philp’s “family support” did not require lesser sentences.

am

Philp’s sister’s testimony as inconsistent with the evidence: “I

determined that Philp

still

is

expressly considered

district court rej ected

having trouble accepting Ms.

Mitchell’s testimony that Mr. Philp has just been doing really well the last 20 years.” (1/ 14/2019

T11, p.33,

L.24 — p.34, L.1.)

And

the friend

who

“help the situation out because [he had] heard

rooﬁe deal” (1/14/2019

Tr., p.27,

found incredible (1/14/2019

testiﬁed at the sentencing hearing just

some

bits

and pieces of what happened about

L.19 — p.28, L.2)—the same “rooﬁe deal” that the

Tr., p.36, Ls.2-7).

The

not giving Philp’s sister’s 0r friend’s testimony any

came

district court

did not abuse

more weight than

it

its

t0

this

district court

discretion

by

already did in fashioning

Philp’s sentences.

Philp

Has Failed T0 Show That The

Districgléourt

Abused

Its

Discretion

BV Denying His

Rule 35 Motions
Philp next asserts that the district court abused

motions.
prevail

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)

0n appeal, Philp must “show

information

subsequently

provided

motion.” Huffman, 144 Idaho
court

on

“new information on

his acceptance

[his]

at

its

by denying

discretion

his

Rule 35

Philp has failed t0 establish an abuse of discretion.

of new 0r additional

that the sentence is excessive in light

t0

the

district

court

in

To

support

0f the

Rule

35

203, 159 P.3d at 840. Philp claims that he presented the district

conduct and programming in prison and

of responsibility and remorse.” (Appellant’s

.

.

.

brief, p.8.)

additional information

But a

not required to reduce a sentence based 0n good behavior in prison, which

district court is

is,

after all, the

E

expectation.

State V. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773,

court did not abuse

discretion in giving

its

little

229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (“[T]he

0r n0 weight t0 Cobler’s

district

good behavior While

in

prison”); State V. Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494, 496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996) (“The district court
further did not abuse

its

discretion in refusing t0

View Copenhaver’s good behavior

between his sentencing and the Rule 35 hearing as a mitigating
observed, Philp’s potential reward for good behavior in prison

is

he

doing, which

is eligible

is

for parole

when

at the

he accepted responsibility.

meant

it

As

the district court

parole: “Everything that

Mr. Philp

good, are things that the parole board will take into consideration as to whether

Furthermore,

really

is

factor.”).

in prison

that date

comes around.” (5/17/2019

Tr., p.13, Ls.8-14.)

sentencing hearing, Philp already claimed that he had remorse and that

(1/14/2019

Tr., p.15,

L.20 — p.16, L.7.) His Rule 35 claim that he

did not require the district court t0 reduce his sentence.

ﬂ M,

148 Idaho

at

774, 229 P.3d at 378 (afﬁrming district court’s denial 0f Rule 35 motion Where defendant

“claim[ed] he ha[d]

new

evidence in the form 0f honest remorse” because, “at the sentencing

hearing, [the defendant] expressed remorse for his crime”). Thus, the district court did not abuse

its

discretion

when

it

denied Philp’s Rule 35 motions.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s judgments

and denial 0f Philp’s Rule 35 motions.

DATED this 9th day 0f September, 2019.
_/s/_Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

0f conviction

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE

IHEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of September, 20 1 9, served a true and correct
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF t0 the attorney listed below by means of iCourt

copy of the attached
File and Serve:

JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

